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Abstract 
In Part I of this two part paper we tried to elicit the ‘essence’ of the notion of interactional 
expertise by looking at its origins.  In Part II we will look at the notion of contributory 
expertise.  The exercise has been triggered by recent discussion of these concepts in this 
journal by Plaisance and Kennedy and by Goddiksen. 
Keywords 
Interactional Expertise; Contributory Expertise; Technical Phase; Political Phase; Policy 
1. Introduction 
This is the second part of a two part re-examination of the concepts of interactional expertise 
and contributory expertise (Collins and Evans, 2002, 2007; Collins 2004a).  We will refer to 
the first part of the re-examination (Collins and Evans, 2015), as ‘Part I’.  In Part I, we 
revisited the concept of interactional expertise (IE).  In this part, ‘Part II’, we are concerned 
with contributory expertise and the broader question of who can contribute in which ways to 
technological decision-making in the public domain.   
2. Who contributes? 
We start our discussion with a brief mention of the relationship between interactional 
expertise (IE) and contributory expertise (CE), pointing out unsolved problems.  We then set 
out the difference between political and technical phases of a technological decision and 
examine the ways in which they interact with each other; this is important if the various ways 
of contributing are to be understood.1  The main exercise, which is an attempt to describe, 
exhaustively, all possible ways that experts and citizens can contribute to these two phases, 
                                                 
1
 The distinction between technical and political phases is developed at length in  Collins, Weinel and Evans 
2010 and 2011 as well as here. 
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starting with the technical contributions and finishing with the political contributions, is set 
out in several separate sections and tables in the middle of the paper. 
Along the way we examine earlier work and introduce a number of new terms to clarify ideas 
and highlight new distinctions that have emerged since the publication of the original ‘Third 
Wave’ paper in 2002. These new terms include, ‘target expertise’, which refers to the set of 
technical expertises implicated in a technological decision; a special term is necessary 
because the target expertise can be different under different perceptions of the nature of a 
dispute.   This leads to a related distinction between political framing and technical 
formulation that highlights the two different ways in which the relevant target expertise might 
be changed. We also clarify the notion of referred expertise showing that it is really two 
things: technical referred expertise and referred discrimination.  Finally, we include some 
terms first introduced in Collins and Weinel (2011) such as ‘domain specific discrimination’ 
and ‘sociological discrimination’, which may be unfamiliar to those who take their categories 
from the original Periodic Table of Expertise (Collins and Evans, 2007).   
The attempt to generate an exhaustive list of ways to contribute is triggered by the argument 
of Plaisance and Kennedy (2015 – hereafter, PK).  They propose that the concept of 
interactional expertise should be softened so that it can legitimate the ideas of ordinary 
citizens who want to intervene in the technical phase of public domain decisions.  In Part I, 
we argued against a definition that would enable the mere invocation of the concept to 
legitimate such interventions.  This would exacerbate the very ‘problem of extension’ 
(Collins and Evans, 2002, 2007) that the idea of interactional expertise was meant to 
ameliorate.  We also argued that, in any case, interactional expertise was only rarely relevant 
to such interventions.  We now want to work out what rights and expertises can be brought to 
bear on technological disputes in the public domain so as to avoid misplaced uses of the 
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concept of interactional expertise.  More positively, we want to show how the wider 
programme known as Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE) can support contributions to 
the technical phase based on many different kinds of expertise while also encompassing 
contributions within the political phase.  We hope this will create a more complete analytical 
context for projects such as that of Plaisance and Kennedy. 
2.1 When does practice end and linguistic discourse begin? 
The arguments of both PK and Goddiksen (2014; Galindo and Duarte, 2015), arise, in part, 
out of problems of definition.  A clear problem is that interactional expertise is in part 
understood through its transitive relationship to contributory expertise (CE) – the ability to 
contribute to an area of practical accomplishment.  The boundary between IE and CE has 
been troublesome from the start, conceptually if not practically, because not all expertises 
appear to have a practical component.  Thus we still have not fulfilled the promise to resolve 
the difference between IE and CE in cases such as literary criticism.  Another example is 
peer-reviewers and committee members who are understood to be primarily interactional 
experts but clearly contribute to the technical domain.2  We still do not know the answer to 
this kind of question but perhaps it is one of those borderline problems that are 
philosophically irritating but which do not pose any serious real world problems: there is 
nothing pressing that we do not know how to handle as a consequence of not having a clear 
borderline while there is much that we can handle as a result of having a distinction between 
interactional and contributory expertise.  Perhaps there is a solution out there somewhere. 
                                                 
2
 We leave out managers because they are a more complicated case 
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2.2 The distinction between political and technical phases 
Technological decision-making in the public domain can be analysed as consisting of two 
phases: the technical phase and the political phase.  These are not ordered sequentially but 
refer instead to two different aspects of the overall problem. In the technical phase, the 
emphasis is on the production of knowledge about the world. In contrast, the political phase 
is concerned with questions of preference and priorities.  Some of the key differences 
between the technical and political phases are summarised in Table 1 below, which is 
reproduced from Collins and Evans’s, 2002, ‘Third Wave’ paper.  
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Political and Technical Phases 
The first row indicates that in the technical phase political and other influences on results 
should be eliminated as far as possible.  We know from Wave 2 of science studies that 
political influences on scientific results can never be avoided but, while there will always be 
intrinsic influences, they should never be extrinsic – that is celebrated or otherwise endorsed.   
To make political influences extrinsic is to negate the form-of-life of science.3  The second 
row of the table indicates that in the political phase contributions to the outcomes of 
technological debates in the public domain can be justified if the parties have a stake in those 
                                                 
3
 Though we agree with Heather Douglas (2007, 2009) that science cannot be value free in any absolute sense, 
we think she may not have given enough consideration to some of the problems of extending technical judging 
rights to the citizenry – See Collins and Evans, under submission. 
  PHASE 
  Political Technical 
NATURE OF 
 
Politics 
 
Extrinsic 
 
Intrinsic 
Rights Stakeholder Meritocratic 
Representation By Survey By Action 
Delegation 
 
By proxy 
 
Impossible 
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outcomes – fairness within a democratic process is the criterion of inclusion -- whereas in the 
technical phase participation can only be justified on the ground of relevant expertise or 
experience (i.e. merit).  The third row indicates that political contributions can be represented 
by surveys or votes by those who have a stake in the matter whereas technical contributions 
are intrinsic to the person of experts because of the way they must continually respond to the 
details of changing circumstances to which the non-expert population has no access.  The 
final row follows from this in that a political actor can employ someone else to act for them 
and represent their position whereas an expert cannot ask someone else to take their place 
unless they are equally expert. 
In subsequent publications (e.g. Evans and Plows, 2007; Weinel, 2010; Collins et al., 2010) 
the relationship between technical and political phases has been set out in more detail, 
although the core principle that, in a democracy, the political phase should always take 
priority, remains unchanged. Instead, the developments have led to a richer understanding of 
how the focus can switch from political phase to technical phase and back again. Thus, for 
example, we now distinguish between ‘upstream mediating’ processes through which 
political concerns and preferences become formulated as technical questions that require 
expert analysis and ‘downstream mediating’ processes through which the outcome of this 
expert analysis is used to inform policy outcomes. When receiving expert advice the defining 
feature of SEE is not that that such advice must be followed – that would be technocracy – 
but that the nature and strength of the consensus that informs that advice must not be 
misrepresented by policy-makers. In other words, policy-makers or citizens do not have to 
heed expert advice but they should not pretend that such advice does not exist or that is 
something other than it is. 
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In Part I we saw one way the distinction between technical and political phases could be 
applied when we imagined that strong fluxes of gravitational waves, the existence of which 
has been rejected by the technical community, if combined with the effects of living near 
power lines might cause cancer.  We agreed that this could change the way previously 
rejected claims were assessed but this would not be a change in the technical phase – the 
likelihood of the existence of strong fluxes would remain the same and would continue to 
justify their rejection as far as decision-making within the technical community was 
concerned.  But a change in the political phase would be invited – something very unlikely, 
according to the scientists, might have to be taken more seriously by those with political 
responsibility.  Keeping the two spheres separate resolves the problem that the technical 
judgements within the esoteric world of gravitational wave physics could become affected by 
power-line scares. We know, of course, that esoteric judgements can be affected by political 
judgements but we still need to make the distinction in order to hold the position that these 
affects should never be extrinsic, only intrinsic, and that it remains the duty of scientists to 
strive to try to exclude political influence on their technical decisions, redoubling the effort if 
they become aware of such influence.4 
We now begin the exhaustive listing of ways to contribute to technological decision-making. 
We start with contributions to the technical phase that are made via interactional expertise in 
the target domain. These are summarised in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
4
 This imperative contrasts starkly with those who argue that since political influence is unavoidable it should be 
endorsed and embraced (Scott, Richards and Martin, 1990; Collins, 1991; Martin, 1994; Collins, 1996).  See 
also footnote 3. 
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Table 2: Ways of contributing within the technical phase that require interactional 
expertise 
2.2 Technical phase contributions via interactional expertise. 
Contributory Expertise: The most straightforward way to contribute to the technical phase 
is via a relevant contributory expertise – line 1 of Table 2.  Here an expert uses their expertise 
to contribute to the domain to which their expertise pertains.  Where the target expertise 
includes a number of different domains of contributory expertise, then some means of sharing 
BASIS DESCRIPTION COMMENT 
Contributory 
expertise 
The standard meaning of technical 
expertise; the contributory expert 
will also be an interactional expert.   
Traditional technical expertise  
Technical 
Formulation 
Determining the boundaries of the 
‘target expertise’ to include those 
with relevant experience based on 
a technical understanding of what 
factors need to be considered. 
Often brings in experience-
based expertise and may add 
non-traditional technical 
expertise to more traditional 
scientific expertises when 
technical phase includes 
problems of application. 
Special 
Interactional 
expertise 
The special interactional expert is 
invited to contribute in virtue of their 
technical understanding of the 
domain   
In principle, quite similar to 
traditional technical expertise 
but rare in practice given the 
importance attached to 
accountability of decisions. 
Domain 
Specific 
Discrimination 
The use of ‘‘non-technical’’ 
expertise by technical experts to 
judge their fellow experts and peers 
Embedded (latent) in both 
interactional and contributory 
expertise 
Sociological 
Discrimination  
The application of the specialist 
skills of the expert social analyst to 
discriminate among technical 
choices (e.g. the identification of a 
‘false controversy’)  
Usually needs deep 
understanding but formal 
metrics are accessible without 
interactional expertise (e.g. 
citations, impact factors) might 
make a contribution 
Technical 
referred 
expertise 
The application of specialist 
expertise from another domain that 
requires interactional expertise in 
the new, target domain if the 
transfer is to succeed 
The technical expertise from 
the source domain is 
conceptually integrated with the 
technical expertise of the target 
domain. 
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expertise between the different practice languages will be needed.  Here we assume that 
interactional expertise provides the solution to this problem, though other outcomes are 
possible (see Collins, Evans and Gorman, 2007). 
Technical Formulation:  Technical formulation, which is found in the second line of the 
table, is a new category that is needed to disambiguate the different elements of upstream 
mediation. Technical formulation concerns the identification of the domains of expertise 
which are needed to address the technical question and belongs within the technical phase. In 
contrast, political framing (discussed under heading 2.6, below) refers to the process by 
which the questions addressed by the technical phase are set and prioritised. The difference 
between technical formulation and political framing is that once a problem is defined by 
political actors (i.e. political framing), the decisions about which domains of expertise are 
relevant (i.e. technical formulation) ought to be made by technical experts.   
The need for such a distinction can be illustrated by the case of the Cumbrian sheep farmers.  
They, as the story is told, possessed a body of technical expertise that was relevant to the 
post-Chernobyl management of sheep.  Their expertise, however, did not seem germane to 
the certified scientists who formulated the problem as something like ‘the half-lives of 
radioactive isotopes and their interactions with soils and vegetation’.  In practice, of course, 
this formulation did not include all the relevant expertises and a more inclusive technical 
formulation that would have included the farmers was needed – something like ‘the ecology 
of sheep farming on radioactive pastures’.  To grasp the technological scope and boundaries 
of a problem requires technical experts; it is not a matter of ideology or vested interests.5 
                                                 
5
 We are assuming here that no one wanted the sheep to stay radioactive any longer than necessary for political 
reasons (e.g. to further marginalise a traditional rural community in order to promote new industries like 
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That said, it is clear that there can be a relationship between political framing and technical 
formulation. For example, political framings that privilege economic interests such as job 
creation over concerns around health or wellbeing will lead to different technical 
formulations.  On the other hand, the power and influence of some sections of the scientific 
community means that it sometimes takes determined political action to create the conditions 
needed to demand a technical reformulation that includes new and more diverse forms of 
expertise.6   
Finally, political framing and technical formulation can be confused because political actions 
are sometimes presented as if they were technical claims.  This is exemplified by the 
controversy over the Brent Spar oil rig.7  Though all parties to the technical debate ultimately 
came to agree that it would have been ecologically more sound to have disposed of the Brent 
Spar at sea, it is possible to argue that the campaign to prevent this, and which led to it being 
disposed of on land in an an ecologically more damaging way, reduced the legitimacy of 
disposals at sea in general.  Reducing the incidence of disposal at sea in order to protect the 
marine environment can be presented as a technical aim – pollution levels will be lower – but 
it can also mask a moral, or quasi-religious motivation, based on the ‘purity’ of the sea which 
cannot be countered by technical arguments.8  For example, should it turn out that oil-rig 
disposal at sea would benefit fish populations by providing safe havens from nets and new 
                                                                                                                                                        
tourism). In these circumstances, not including the farmers was a technical mistake and not a deliberate political 
act. 
6
 In our view Epstein (2009, 2011) confuses the two; he is correct in pointing out that the AIDS treatment testing 
regime would not have been influenced by the views of the community of sufferers without their political 
activism but the outcome was technical reformulation not political reframing.   
7
 Collins, Weinel and Evans (2010) 
8
 From the quasi-religious viewpoint, estimating the benefits that might accrue from disposal of oil rigs is akin 
to conducting a cost-benefit analysis of torture techniques. 
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sources of nourishment for marine life, it would make no difference because the sea would 
still be ‘polluted’ by oil rigs. None of this is to deny that ‘purity’ of this kind is a perfectly 
legitimate political aim; the point here is simply that it should never be disguised as a 
technical matter.9   
The question, as always, is who decides?  In the case of political framing it is a matter of the 
normal political process but what about technical formulation?  Who is the body of experts 
who chooses the experts?  The examples of AD-X2, Laetrile and the MMR vaccine all 
suggest that lay people and/or politicians cannot be relied upon to get it right, but the sheep 
farmer case, along with many other examples of boundary work examined by STS, show that 
the experts cannot always be relied upon either. Who, then, is best placed to make what is 
essentially a technical judgement?  The answer has to be a combination of contributory 
experts from within the target domain supplemented by suitably informed, expertise-minded, 
social scientists.  Elsewhere we refer to such a groups as ‘The Owls’; they are chosen for 
their ability to explore reflexively the problem domain and its constituent parts.10  
Special Interactional Expertise:  Returning to Table 2, row 3 is ‘special interactional 
expertise’.  Special interactional experts are individuals who possess no practical expertise of 
direct relevance to the domain but who we can imagine being able to make credible, and even 
                                                 
9
 See Huxham and Sumner 1999 for discussion of fish populations and other relevant features of Brent Spar 
debate.  There are, of course, other examples in which such ‘quasi-religious’ moral positions are used to 
preclude certain kinds of research. Examples include: eugenics; nuclear weapons testing, certain kinds of 
medical research and the production of genetically modified organisms for food. 
10‘The Owls’ idea is developed in ‘Elective Modernism’ (Collins and Evans, under submission).  The Owl 
metaphor begins with Richard Feynman’s claim, or supposed claim, that scientists need philosophers like birds 
need ornithologists. Extending his bird metaphor, Owls are wise birds that a capable of turning their heads to 
look in opposite directions, both at sociological aspects of science and technical aspects.  Though most 
scientists, as Feynman was effectively pointing out, do not understand how science works -- they understand 
only how to do it -- a few can look in both directions.  There are also some social scientists who can look in both 
directions.   
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creditable, contributions to, say, specialist scientific committees tasked with discussing the 
future of a specialist technical domain.   As discussed in the context of the Barish/Collins 
argument (see Part I), however, in many circumstances the purely interactional expert will 
not and should not be in a position to exercise the power that goes with the responsibility of 
the corresponding professional scientists. 
Domain Specific Discrimination: Row 4 of Table 2 is domain specific discrimination.  This 
is the ability, acquired through socialisation in a specialist technical domain, to make social 
judgments between the scientists belonging to the domain and transmute those judgments into 
technical judgments.  This is what scientists do to close disputes, break the experimenters’ 
regress, and so forth.  Though Collins and Evans, 2007 does not formally distinguish this 
ability from ‘local discrimination’, a footnote in that work (p50, fn. 10), provides a range of 
examples of social criteria that gravitational wave scientists use to judge the worth of 
experimental results obtained by colleagues:  
Faith in experimental capabilities and honesty, based on a previous working 
partnership; Personality and intelligence of experimenters; reputation of running a 
huge lab; Whether or not the scientist worked in industry or academia; Previous 
history of failures; 'Inside information;' Style and presentation of results; 
Psychological approach to experiment; Size and prestige of university of origin; 
Integration into various scientific networks; Nationality.  
Although such judgements are based on a kind of meta-expertise (i.e. expertise about 
expertise) it is a meta-expertise that comes only with socialisation into the expert community 
and hence with the acquisition of interactional expertise. It is for this reason that Domain 
Specific Discrimination belongs in Table 2. 
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Sociological Discrimination:  Sociological Discrimination is found in row 5 of Table 2.  It is 
the application of the specialist skill of the expert social analyst being used to discriminate 
among technical choices. This requires an understanding of the specialist community and is 
thus only available to those with at least some interactional expertise in the target domain in 
order to provide a focus for the application of social science contributory expertise (Weinel 
2010; Collins and Weinel 2011).11  Weinel (2009, 2012), for example, using sociological 
discrimination, has argued that the publicly visible controversy about the toxicity of anti-
retroviral drugs that stalled an effective response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa for several 
years was an ‘inauthentic scientific controversy’.  A social scientist familiar with HIV/AIDS 
research in the late 1990s would have been able to argue that Mbeki was not representing the 
scientific consensus accurately. 
Technical Referred Expertise:  The last row of Table 2 returns us to referred expertise.  
This was classed under meta-expertise in the original (Collins and Evans, 2007) Periodic 
Table of Expertises but new to this analysis is our splitting it into two parts, one a specialist 
expertise, which we will call ‘technical referred expertise’ to save confusion with the old 
usage, and one a meta-expertise that we will refer to as ‘referred discrimination’.  We will 
discuss referred discrimination under heading 2.6.  This split better characterises the ways 
managers from one technical specialty contribute to another technical specialty.   
Technical referred expertise is now formally linked to interactional expertise. Technical 
referred expertise is technical expertise (eg from high energy physics) applied to a different 
                                                 
11
 It might appear that some kinds of sociological discrimination can be accomplished without interactional 
expertise via the use of metrics to rank scientific contributions (eg. Shwed and Bearman 2010). This might work 
in some cases (e.g. established papers have high citation counts) but would not work well as a leading indicator 
or in domains where this infrastructure does not exist (e.g. what is the equivalent for sheep farmers?).  
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‘target specialism’ (eg gravitational wave physics).  Crucially, technical referred expertise 
requires both source and target expertise to be understood so the expert must have at least at 
least, interactional expertise in the target domain.12  This is what distinguishes technical 
referred expertise from support and facilitation or merely supplying deliverables (see next 
heading), because in those cases the expert does not need interactional expertise.   
2.3 Technical phase contributions without target expertise. 
For completeness and to resolve some confusion it is important to recognise that sometimes 
contributions to the technical phase can be made without requiring any expertise in the target 
domain beyond the ubiquitous expertises that link people in society into a broad working 
relationship.  Table 3 lists these 
 
Table 3: Ways of contributing within the technical phase that do not require interactional 
expertise 
Deliverables: In the case of deliverables, experts in the target domain employ experts from 
another domain to supply certain technical services such as compiling literature reviews, 
                                                 
12
 For further discussion of these distinctions see Collins and Sanders, 2007.  Duarte, 2013, also distinguishes 
between the generic work of the technicians and the domain-specific work of the paleo-oceanographers.   
BASIS DESCRIPTION COMMENT 
Deliverables  
 
A person is brought in to fulfil a 
specialist technical task of a type 
that applies across many 
specialities and does not require 
interactional expertise in the main 
domain 
Traditional technical expertise 
from elsewhere which is 
applied to the technical 
domain in question without 
being conceptually integrated 
Support and 
facilitation 
Supporting a laboratory as living 
and working space by supplying 
technical services 
Requires general working 
expertises  
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solving a set of equations or analysing data-sets.  The difference with technical referred 
expertise is that the target domain experts take responsibility for melding the deliverable 
expertise into the target domain. To the extent that any shared understanding is needed, then 
it is provided by the experts from the target domain, requiring them to have at least 
interactional expertise of the source domain.  Such arrangements are possible because most 
‘deliverables’ are of a general science kind so target experts are already likely to possess the 
necessary understanding.  But if this is not the case, it will be the target experts who make the 
effort to acquire it.   The person supplying deliverables can work to a pre-set formula without 
understanding the scientific purpose of the exercise.   
Support and Facilitation:  In earlier discussions (Collins and Evans 2007, p.70-71), we have 
put forward the distinction between ‘making a contribution’ by performing a supporting or 
enabling role and being a contributory expert.  We can now see this ‘support and facilitation’ 
as another kind of deliverable.  An extreme example is the truck driver who delivers the 
central heating fuel to the scientific laboratory without which it could not function; the truck 
driver has an expertise without which the laboratory could not function but we would not 
argue that this means the target expertise ought to be re-framed so as to include it.  It is just 
an outside expertise that is required in a ‘non-complex’ division of labour in which the parties 
to the division of labour do not require deep understanding of each others’ specialist technical 
lives.13  Of course, this is not to say that delivering central heating oil is unskilled: the truck 
driver will possess a huge amount of ubiquitous expertise in respect of mundane social life, 
which will be shared with the technical specialists, as well as some esoteric expertises 
relating to the transport of hazardous chemicals; the point is that there is no need for either 
                                                 
13
 The distinction between complex and non-complex divisions of labour is introduced in Part I 
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specialist expertise to be shared.  Seen this way, the only difference between an equation 
solver and a truck driver is a sociological one – the former’s expertise belongs to the domain 
of science and might very well be shared by the scientists themselves, the latter does not and 
is, therefore, much less likely to be shared as scientists.  Straightforward management 
expertise – Gant charts, accountancy, decision-making in respect of how money is spent, and 
so forth – probably spans these two categories of contribution-making. 
2.4 Technical phase contributions via meta-expertise 
Table 4 lists the contributions to the technical phase that can be made on the basis of 
expertise about the target domain rather than expertise in that domain. In other words, it lists 
contributions to the technical phase that rely on meta-expertises. As explained in more detail 
below, there is an important distinction between judgements that do not require any 
understanding of the target domain and those that assume at least some awareness of its 
characteristics and nature. The former expertises – those that require no target expertise – are 
called ‘transmuted’ expertises as they transmute a purely social judgement (who to trust, who 
to believe) into a technical one (what exists, how to act effectively). In contrast, non-
transmuted expertises include some element of target domain understanding. 
Ubiquitous Discrimination:  The first form of meta-expertise listed is ubiquitous 
discrimination.  This refers to everyday judgements about trust and credibility but is of little 
interest as it rarely, if ever, makes a contribution to the technical phase. It is more likely to 
have an effect on technological decision-making via upstream or downstream mediation in 
the political phase.  
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Table 4: Ways of contributing via meta-expertise 
Local Discrimination:  The second row of Table 4 lists, local discrimination, which has the 
potential to be far more powerful than ubiquitous discrimination and which may, in some 
cases, make a contribution to the technical phase.  Local discrimination relies on knowledge 
of the particular local circumstances that attend a specific piece of scientific research or 
research location rather than its technical content per se.  For example, local citizens’ 
scepticism about the reassurances offered by official spokespersons representing the 
Sellafield nuclear re-reprocessing plant (which is near the Cumbrian fells) was justified by 
their knowledge that the same institution had been less than completely open in the past.  
Here local knowledge was fed into citizens’ social assessments of the institution and was 
‘transmuted’ into judgements about technical claims. In this example there was no direct 
BASIS DESCRIPTION COMMENT 
Ubiquitous 
discrimination 
Everyday judgements of expert’s 
demeanour etc 
Too unreliable to count as a 
contribution to the technical 
phase 
Local 
discrimination 
Cases where a person has special 
knowledge of the practices of the 
experts or the local domain of 
application.   
Typically used to identify a 
failure to uphold standards; 
whistle blowing is an 
important example 
Downward 
discrimination 
Use of what can be limited 
understanding to identify those who 
know still less 
Allows participants in 
technical phase to set the 
lower limit or floor on 
expertise needed 
Technical 
Connoisseur-
ship 
Familiarity or use of a ‘technology’ 
such that preferences reflect back on 
technical choices  
A hybrid in that consumer 
preferences are integral to 
technologies 
Referred 
discrimination 
Judgements based on experiences in 
other domains that are sufficiently 
general as to NOT need conceptual 
integration into the target domain. 
New label to distinguish 
between referred 
judgements that do and do 
not draw on interactional 
expertise. 
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contribution to the production of knowledge in technical phase so it might be better seen as 
downstream mediation.   
In other, more unusual cases, local discrimination can lead to a contribution in the technical 
phase. Imagine, for example, that workers in a plant or local citizens come across details of 
corrupt practices that indicate that the technical work is not being done properly or according 
to the norms of science.  In this case, making such knowledge public can have an impact on 
the technical phase because a particular set of data and/or expert will come to be excluded 
from the technical discussion.  This ‘whistle-blowing’ is of enormous importance; it is an 
example of transmuted expertise as it does not rely on an understanding of the content of the 
technical expertise, only on the social judgement that appropriate norms of honesty and 
diligence have not been followed.14  The discovery by journalists and other researchers that 
various scientific groups are in the pay of powerful industries such as the tobacco industry or 
the oil industry such that their publications and other claims should be discounted is another 
example of the transmutation of expertise.15 
Downward Discrimination:  Downward discrimination can also rest on a low level general 
understanding of science but it is understanding of a technical kind.  An example is the GMO 
protestor who argued that GMO crops would be radioactive since radioactive markers were 
                                                 
14
 See also Collins, 2014. Note that this definition of whistle-blowers means that both ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ 
can be whistle-blowers. This means that neither contributory nor interactional expertise are necessary for 
whistle-blowing (apart from the basic knowledge needed to recognise that the shared standards of science are 
not being upheld).  Whistle-blowing often rests on citizens’ understanding of the nature of science and its 
distinctiveness from politics, something which social scientists ought to be concerned to stress.  
15
 In practice, it may be necessary for some technical experts to evaluate the whistle-blower’s claim to determine 
its significance for consensus within the target expertise but this would be a normal part of technical phase 
work. Such filtering and evaluation is necessary because not all claims to whistle-blowing are equally 
significant.  For example, the exposure of the so-called ‘Climategate’ emails have been presented as whistle-
blowing but this reveals more about the lack of public understanding of science then about climate science (eg 
see Collins 2014) 
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used in their development (Harvey, 2005).  Only a very low level of scientific knowledge is 
needed to understand that this is incorrect so this is most likely to be the kind of technical 
judgement made by participants in the technical phase when they decide that a claim is not 
worth further investigation even when it is outside their core expertise.   
Technical Connoisseurship:  The application of technical connoisseurship in the technical 
phase is more complicated.  In the original Periodic Table we describe technical 
connoisseurship in terms of a householder’s, or an architect’s judgment about whether, say, 
tiles have been laid properly on a wall or a floor of a kitchen or bathroom but we now think 
the concept can be applied more widely and relates to the ‘social construction of technology’ 
(Bijker et al 1987).  For example, citizens’ contributions to the design of consumer items 
such as cars and computers can be seen as the exercise of technical connoisseurship as users 
contribute via their ‘use’ of the technology.  This follows from one of the central ideas 
belonging to the sociology of technology, namely that design prerogatives extend well 
beyond the traditional core-group specialists to encompass a diverse mix of social groups that 
includes both users and non-users. If this is the case, then the number of legitimate 
participants might be very large whereas it will be small in the case of esoteric, technical 
disputes.  Where the body of consumers is large the technical phase also extends far into the 
citizenry.   
Referred Discrimination:  The final entry in Table 4 is the referred discrimination 
mentioned in the last section.  The example we have in mind is managers who are used to 
dealing with scientists in one esoteric domain and bring that skill to bear on a new technical 
domain.  The skill applied here is an understanding of humans – scientists – rather than a 
technical understanding of a domain of science, hence the use of the term ‘discrimination’ 
which we have traditionally used for judgements about experts.  Referred discrimination 
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occurs when a manager, practised in dealing with scientists in a source domain, applies that 
expertise to the target domain.  For example, managers will know that scientists who 
champion a particular approach to a problem will often claim, in a strident way, that others’ 
ideas will not work whereas the championed ideas are simple and ready to apply; the skilled 
manager will know when and how to discount these claims and when not to.     
2.5 Contributions in the political phase 
We now move from technical contributions to political contributions.  As noted in earlier 
(section 2.1) it is useful to distinguish between upstream and downstream interventions: 
upstream, society influences the future path of technical debate; downstream it reacts to 
proffered technical conclusions.  In Collins and Evans (under submission) we refer to this as 
the sandwich model.16  Table 5 is meant to be an exhaustive list of types of political 
intervention. 
                                                 
16
  Technical disputes being the filling, the slices of bread being, respectively upstream and downstream political 
contributions or interventions, and the butter or mayonnaise being institutions that mediate between political and 
technical phases. 
21 
 
 
Table 5: Ways of contributing or intervening within the political phase 
Upstream Political Framing:  Upstream political framing is concerned with setting agendas 
and influencing the kinds of technical work that are prioritised. It is the means by which 
technical priorities and questions are set and encompasses many different kinds of social 
BASIS DESCRIPTION COMMENT 
Upstream Political 
Framing 
Contributions that seek to delineate 
the scope of the problem as 
defined by political actors, 
stakeholders and the like.  
 
May lead to technical 
reformulation or to the 
conclusion that the 
problem is not a 
technical one 
 
Downstream Political 
Framing 
 
Contributions that seek to 
determine how to respond to the 
claims of technical experts. 
Possible responses include 
adoption, rejection, regulation, 
prohibition or calls for further 
research. 
 
May feed into further 
upstream political 
framing by raising 
new questions 
Citizenship 
The everyday actions of citizens, 
including the wider scientific 
community, as they express 
preferences and make choices.  
 
Normal politics.  
May also include exit, 
voice and loyalty 
paradigm of consumer 
behaviour 
Stake-holding 
 
 
Similar to everyday actions of 
citizenship but related to individuals 
and/or organisations that have 
some special status with regard to 
the technical claims being made 
(e.g. patients, residents, 
employees, literal and metaphorical 
ownership) 
 
Normal politics. 
Implies some level of 
organisation through 
which stakeholder 
claims are articulated 
and made visible. 
 
Resourcing 
Funders, philanthropists, 
enthusiasts, amateur data-
collectors, may alter the direction of 
research or contribute to its 
success 
Normal politics. 
May be influenced by 
success of 
stakeholders in raising 
awareness (e.g. 
breast cancer 
charities) 
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institutions and processes from the private sector market through crowd sourcing experiments 
and venture capital investors to state sponsored research programmes. To the extent that this 
political framing claims to represent the priorities and concerns of all citizens, or can 
reasonably be claimed to affect all citizens, then ‘the proper participants are in principle 
every democratic citizen.’17  Political framing, and re-framing, where the established frame is 
replaced with another, perhaps through political actions, sets the scene for the technical 
formulation or re-formulation discussed under heading 2.4.  Defining an issue as a ‘public 
health problem’ rather than an ‘economic problem’, for example, has quite clear implications 
for which kinds of expertise are relevant and the standards to which such expertise should be 
held accountable.18 
Downstream Political Framing:  The second row of Table 5 deals with what happens 
downstream.  Downstream political framing is a reaction to the outcomes of technical 
debates.  As with upstream framing, these responses may take place at the level of the 
individual (e.g. consumer choices) or the organisation (e.g. professional judgement) or the 
nation state (e.g. regulation to control or prohibit).  In addition, the Third Wave perspective 
argues that, whatever the decision reached, the technical consensus should not be 
misrepresented in the public debate so as to pretend that a political decision was really a 
scientific decision.  Political decisions are never scientific decisions and politicians should 
not evade political responsibility by pretending that they are.  The pretence can work in two 
directions.  For example, Thabo Mbeki failed to realise or accept that there was strong 
scientific consensus over the efficacy of anti-retroviral drugs and avoided political 
                                                 
17
 Wynne (2003), quote at p. 411. 
18
 Another way of phrasing this concern with how societies’ frame problems and determine how they should be 
addressed would be to talk in terms of ‘civic epistemology’, e.g. Jasanoff,  2005. 
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responsibility for his decision not to distribute them in South Africa by claiming that disputes 
found on the internet indicated that there was no scientific consensus when there was.  In 
contrast, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan often acted as if there was a scientific 
consensus among economists that backed up their policies when there was not; indeed, even 
today the idea that ‘there is no alternative’ to current economic policies is routinely used by 
politicians to defend economic policies and the hardship they create.19  Both these ways of 
avoiding political responsibility emerge from representing a judgement in the political phase 
as a technical phase judgement.  In another place, we suggest that a panel of experts in the 
substantive domains involved and in the social analysis of science – The Owls – be tasked 
with providing an account of the scope and strength of technical consensus in the technical 
phase of any public technological dispute in order to reduce the chance that the degree of 
technical consensus will be distorted to serve political purposes.20   
Citizenship and Stakeholding:  The third and fourth rows of the table cover citizenship and 
stakeholding.  These are both matters of making political choices but the more directly the 
individual contributor is affected by a decision, the more he or she is a stakeholder rather than 
a citizen.  Stakeholders have something personal to lose or gain; citizens prefer this political 
option rather than that, perhaps for selfless or ideological reasons.   
Resourcing:  The final row of the table, ‘resourcing’, concerns the ways in which the work 
needed for participation in the technical phase is enabled. Financial support can promote a 
certain position while symbolic and cultural support can ensure that certain technical issues 
                                                 
19
 For a recent example – the 2013 Budget – see: http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-
analysis/2013/03/07/david-cameron-s-economy-speech-in-full 
20
 See also footnote 10  
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remain visible within the public domain and therefore remain objects of public concern, more 
likely to attract material resources. 
2.6 Conclusion on contributing to technical debates 
The above attempt to list all the ways of contributing to either the technical or political phase 
within wider technological debates is intended to resolve some of the confusions about the 
relationship between interactional and contributory expertise and provide a context for our 
understanding of how specialists and citizens can legitimately affect the world of science and 
technology.  We think the project of Plaisance and Kennedy (2015) could benefit from the 
application of some of the distinctions made in Tables 1-5 because at least some of the time 
they appear to be talking about persons who might make a contribution to the technical phase 
without being either an interactional expert or a contributory expert in respect of the target 
expertise.  In most cases, citizens will contribute through their participation in the political 
phase. There are some scenarios in which citizens will contribute to the technical phase but, 
of these, only a small sub-set will depend on the use of interactional expertise.  We hope that 
Tables 1-5 will make the nature of various kinds of contribution clearer. 
Of course, in real life types of contribution are often mixed up.  A citizen may have a stake in 
in some technology and this might cause them to acquire some interactional expertise 
relevant to the technology and/or act politically so as to change the framing of a debate, either 
politically or technically, or blow the whistle on scientifically corrupt local practices and so 
on.  So why bother with all these analytical distinctions when, as far as the citizen-actor is 
concerned, it is often all of a piece?  The answer is the motivation of the Third Wave, which 
is to retain a separate sphere for technical debates so as to preserve a notion of expertise.  If 
the politics and the technical aspects of a debate are continually mixed then the difference 
between politics and science/expertise will disappear and therein lies dystopia. 
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3. Conclusion 
We have argued that the discussions of Plaisance and Kennedy (2015) and Goddiksen (2014) 
have missed the essence of interactional expertise in so far as it can be distilled from the 
origins of the concept.21  We have also argued that their projects could benefit from a more 
wide-ranging analysis of who can contribute to technological debates and how they can do it.  
Nevertheless, we are extremely grateful for their work and their proposals.  It is only through 
critical discussions that concepts can gain real depth.  We, who include the inventors of the 
concepts of interactional and contributory expertise, have learned a huge amount about both 
concepts through having to search back through our archives and through having to think 
anew about the many problems of definition that beset them and the relationship between 
them.  We hope they are becoming better and richer concepts as a result of the exchanges.  
No doubt there is much more to be done. 
  
                                                 
21
 We also note that Goddiksen (2014) suggests that a defining criterion of interactional expertise is that it can 
be used for communication between language communities.  But, as Galindo and Duarte (2015) point out, there 
are a number of other methods of communication between language groups (set out in Figure 1 of (Collins et al. 
2007) and interactional expertise is only occasionally used in this way. See Reyes Galindo (2011) and Duarte 
(2013). 
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